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Doubt about traces is to be dispelled by reference to the sheer  
difficulty of psychological explanation without them. 
(John Sutton, 1998: 300) 
 
Abstract. During the first half of the 20th century, many philosophers of memory opposed the 
postulation of memory traces based on the claim that a satisfactory account of remembering need 
not include references to causal processes involved in recollection. However, in 1966, an 
influential paper by Martin and Deutscher showed that causal claims are indeed necessary for a 
proper account of remembering. This, however, did not settle the issue, as in 1977 Malcolm argued 
that even if one were to buy Martin and Deutscher’s argument for causal claims, we still don’t 
need to postulate the existence of memory traces. This paper reconstructs the dialectic between 
realists and anti-realists about memory traces, suggesting that ultimately realists’ arguments 
amount to inferences to the best explanation. I then argue that Malcolm’s anti-realist strategy 
consists in the suggestion that causal explanations that do not invoke memory traces are at least as 
good as those that do. But then, contra Malcolm, I argue that there are a large number of memory 
phenomena for which explanations that do not postulate the existence of memory traces are 
definitively worse than explanations that do postulate them. Next, I offer a causal model based on 
an interventionist framework to illustrate when memory traces can help to explain memory 
phenomena and proceed to substantiate the model with details coming from extant findings in the 
neuroscience of memory.  
 
1. Introduction 
The notion of memory trace is as old as our interest in understanding memory. It predates 
the distinction between philosophy and psychology; indeed, it predates the distinction between 
philosophy and science. In the Theaetetus, for instance, Plato talks of experiences leaving traces 
in our memory as seal rings leave impressions in a wax table (194c). These impressions—the 
analogy tells us—are representatives of the seal ring, just as memory traces are representatives of 
the experiences that created them. Zeno the Stoic and Aristotle also embraced the view that 
perception leaves traces, and that such traces give rise to the memories we later on recover during 
recollection. 1  The appeal to memory traces persists in many modern philosophers’ writings, 
including Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill.2 Aside from some notorious skeptics,3 the 
use of memory traces to explain the phenomenon of recollection was so widespread during the 19th 
century that it became the received view by the time psychology established itself as an 
independent discipline around the 1870s.  
 By the end of the 19th century both philosophers and psychologists seemed to agree that, 
given the status of neuroscience at the time, memory traces were merely hypothetical. However, 
philosophers and psychologists disagreed as to how to interpret the scope of this hypothesis. On 
the one hand, philosophers saw the postulation of memory traces as a theory-independent 
hypothesis. Memory traces were hypothetical precisely because their acceptance within a theory 
of memory was at stake. As a result, they thought that the first step in order to know whether or 
not there are memory traces was conceptual: one needed to find out whether the notion of memory 
trace was at all required for our correct understanding of memory. On the other hand, psychologists 
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thought of memory traces as a theory-dependent hypothesis; indeed, they thought of it as a 
psychophysical hypothesis. 4  From the psychologist’s point of view, memory traces were 
hypothetical, not because we were questioning whether they were required at all for a correct 
account of memory, but rather because we just didn’t know what sort of physical (i.e., neural) 
entity they could be. Psychologists thought that the task of verifying the nature of memory traces 
was an empirical one; it had to do with finding out the nature and precise location of memory 
traces in the brain, not with whether or not we were justified in postulating them. Thus, while 
philosophers like Russell and Broad were interested in finding out whether or not we required the 
notion of memory trace in order to have a full-fledged account of remembering, psychologists like 
Semon—who coined the term “engram” to refer to memory traces—and James were in the 
business of devising theories about the biological and physiological nature of memory traces.5 
As a result, during the first part of the 20th century, the existence of memory traces became 
the object of two different and independent inquiries: one scientific or empirical, and one 
philosophical or conceptual. Indeed, for many philosophers engaged in the latter, developments in 
the psychology and neuroscience of memory were often seen as irrelevant to answering the 
philosophical question about the existence of memory traces.6 After all—they reasoned—if we are 
not justified in postulating their existence, then we have less reason to believe that scientists are 
warranted in taking memory traces to be the sort of entity that can be empirically discoverable. 
Against this background, a number of philosophers—including Russell, Ryle, Wittgenstein, and 
Benjamin 7—strongly argued against the view that a successful account of remembering requires 
any reference whatsoever to a causal intermediary between the past experience and its subsequent 
recollection. This skepticism fueled an anti-realist view about memory traces that found its clearest 
expression in Malcolm’s opposition to the realist stance offered by Martin and Deutscher.8  
The purpose of this essay is to critically examine Malcolm’s anti-realist strategy vis-à-vis 
Martin and Deutscher’s proposal, and to offer an argument for a realist view about memory traces. 
More precisely, I argue that Malcom’s argument against the need for invoking memory traces in 
our explanations of remembering is flawed, and that in fact we often need to postulate them. To 
that end, I will begin, in section 2, by going over Malcolm’s influential characterization of memory 
traces. As I will explain, this characterization identifies three necessary conditions for something 
to be a memory trace. One of these conditions—the causal condition—constitutes the target of 
Malcolm’s argument, as it employed by realists about memory traces to postulate their existence.  
Next, in section 3, I show that the use of this causal condition to postulate the existence of memory 
traces is a particular instance of an argumentative strategy in the philosophy of science whereby 
theorists postulate the existence of unobservable entities supposedly referred to by our theoretical 
terms. Specifically, I claim that arguments in favor of the reality of memory traces are usually 
inferences to the best explanation (IBE), motivated by the realist’s rejection of causal explanations 
involving action at a temporal distance. Malcolm’s anti-realist move is to argue that, for the case 
of remembering, causal explanations involving spatiotemporal gaps between cause and effect are 
at least as good explanations as those involving memory traces, thus undercutting the realist’s 
motivation to postulate their existence. 
In section 4, I argue against this anti-realist strategy, not by way of showing that action at 
a distance is not possible, but rather by suggesting that the mere acceptance of action at a distance 
still does not give us the best possible causal explanation for recollection. More specifically, I 
argue that even if one accepts the possibility of causal explanations involving action at a distance, 
there are still many causally related questions about recollection for which that sort of explanation 
is insufficient. I offer instead, in section 5, a model for the causal explanation of recollection using 
Forthcoming in The Harvard Review of Philosophy – Final Draft – 3/24/20 
 3 
an interventionist framework.9 I explain how such an account would fare better than the mere 
action at a distance account—and, incidentally, than the mere causal account—when it comes to 
many causally relevant questions about recollection. As anticipated, this proposed model requires 
the existence of causally relevant memory traces. To substantiate the model, I offer—in section 
6—a mechanistic interpretation of the postulated memory traces drawing from recent 
developments in the neuroscience of learning and memory. I explain what, according to these 
empirical findings, memory traces may be, and how they can behave causally as suggested by the 
interventionist model. Finally, in section 7, I briefly discuss three possible objections to my 
argument.  
 
2. The philosophical notion of memory trace  
Although there are some disagreements in the way philosophers of memory use the notion 
of memory trace, 10  for the current purposes I will endorse the characterization favored by 
Malcolm.11 According to this view, in its most general form, “memory trace” is used in reference 
to an entity or a process (or a set of entities or processes), M, that exist during a period of time, t2, 
between a time, t1, in which a subject, S, experiences a particular event x, Ex, and a subsequent 
time, t3, in which S remembers or recollects x, Rx. Additionally, according to Malcolm, in order 
for M to be the memory trace of x, Mx, three conditions must obtain. First, there is the causal 
condition, which states that a memory trace must play a causal role in the recollection of the event 
it is a trace of; Mx needs to have been caused by Ex, and in turn it needs to be the cause of Rx. 
Second, there is the retention condition, which says that a memory trace must retain the intentional 
content entertained during the remembered event; that is, to be the memory trace of Ex, the 
intentional content acquired by Mx at t1 need to be kept unchanged through t2 until retrieved at t3. 
Finally, there is the isomorphism condition, which claims that a memory trace must be structurally 
similar or isomorphic to that which is remembered; that is, the intentional content entertained 
during Rx must be isomorphic to that of Ex because its structural isomorphism is preserved through 
t2 by Mx. 
Many philosophers have argued against the last two conditions on conceptual and empirical 
grounds. Some have suggested, for instance, that it is not at all clear what it means to say that 
memory traces preserve or retain mental contents through time,12 or that they need to do so in a 
format that, in any interesting way, is structurally isomorphic to the remembered experience or 
event (e.g., Rosen 1975). In fact, some have argued that memory traces cannot meet the 
isomorphism condition because experiences don’t have structures, and thus there is no structure to 
preserve or reinstate at retrieval.13 Likewise, on the basis of scientific findings, other philosophers 
have argued against the claim that if memory traces are neural entities, then there most likely 
cannot be a meaningful way of talking about memory traces preserving any sort of mental 
content—as opposed to, say, reconstructing it during retrieval.14  
Although I will briefly mention the retention and the isomorphism conditions toward the 
end of the paper, my focus here will be on the causal condition, as it constitutes the backbone of 
the dialectic between realists and anti-realists about memory traces. More precisely, as I show in 
the next section, while both realists and anti-realists about memory traces seem to agree on a causal 
condition for remembering, they disagree as to whether or not it entails the need to postulate causal 
intermediaries, and this disagreement divides their ontological commitments regarding memory 
traces. 
 
3. Memory traces as theoretical posits 
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As mentioned above, skepticism about memory traces gained some initial prominence in 
contemporary philosophy of memory with the publication of Russell’s The Analysis of the Mind 
in 1921. There, Russell argued that given the precarious state of the science of memory at the time, 
if we were to take causal claims about past experiences causing present recollections to be 
meaningful, then we need to find a way to interpret such claims without the appeal to unobservable 
(and, thus, unverifiable) causal intermediaries. His proposal, very much in the spirit of positivism, 
was to introduce the notion of “mnemic causation,” viz. the view according to which a past 
experience can be the direct cause of a subsequent recollection. In other words, according to 
Russell’s theory of mnemic causation, there is nothing wrong with saying that Ex at t1 is the direct 
proximal cause of Rx at t3. Notice, incidentally, that this strategy is not that dissimilar from that 
employed by methodological behaviorists, prominently Watson and Skinner, for whom 
explanations about learning needed to include only stimuli and responses outside of the organism, 
with the former almost always diachronically separated from the latter.15 Far from being a far-
fetched proposal, I reckon, Russell’s theory of mnemic causation was very much a la par with 
contemporaneous psychological theories of learning.16 
Russell’s criticism of the notion of memory trace inherent in his theory of mnemic 
causation was echoed, and amplified, by Wittgenstein, who was strongly opposed to the idea of 
invoking any kind of intermediary trace to explain memory. In his Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology—written in the mid-1940s—Wittgenstein famously remarked that “whatever [an 
experienced] event does leave behind in the organism, it isn’t the memory”.17  Moreover, he 
seemed to suggest that our tendency to think that memories are caused by traces speaks to the need 
of modifying our idea of causation itself: 
 
I saw this man years ago: now I have seen him again, I recognize him, I remember his name. 
And why does there have to be a cause of this remembering in my nervous system? Why 
must something or other, whatever it may be, be stored-up there in any form? Why must a 
trace have been left behind? Why should there not be a psychological regularity to which no 
physiological regularity corresponds? If this upsets our concepts of causality then it is high 
time they were upset.18  
 
Wittgenstein’s skepticism was then carried on by Ryle and Benjamin, but, I daresay, it found its 
most clear expression in his disciple Norman Malcolm. In fact, Malcolm not only denies the need 
to postulate memory traces to give an account of remembering, he even denies that we need to talk 
about experiences causing memories at all. For instance, in his influential work Knowledge and 
Certainty, he emphatically declares that “our use of the language of memory” carries no 
implication about the causes of our remembering or about the causal mechanisms involved in our 
recollections.19 As a result, Malcolm’s view—at least in 1963—was that we don’t need to postulate 
the existence of memory traces as causal intermediaries between an experience, Ex, and its 
recollection, Rx, because we can dispose of the causal condition altogether; neither our concept of 
memory nor of remembering requires any reference whatsoever to causes or causal processes and, 
as a result, we can easily do away without them. 
Shortly after, however, Martin and Deutscher’s celebrated paper Remembering, published 
in 1966, put realism about memory traces back on the table. The main purpose of that paper was 
to argue against the claim that a causal condition is not required for a proper analysis of our concept 
of remembering. Their argument is based on cases—some real, some imaginary—of people that 
had a particular experience x at a certain time, t1. Then, during some subsequent and arbitrary 
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interval of time, t2, they forget the event. However, at a later time, t3, these people do something 
“for which the only reasonable explanation” (Martin and Deutscher 1966: 176) is that they 
experienced x at t1. The observation that a causal claim is required in order to make sense of their 
behavior at t3 as a consequence of the experience at t1 motivates Martin and Deutscher to claim 
that “if a person’s account of what he saw is not due even in part to his seeing it, it cannot be said 
that he remembers what he saw” (Martin and Deutscher 1966: 175-176). Since the examples 
Martin and Deutscher discuss intuitively fall under our concept of remembering, then they 
conclude that a person’s recollection of x must be due to her having experienced x. Thus, they 
formulate their causal condition (CC) for remembering: 
 
(CC)  S’s experience of a particular event x, Ex, causes—or, at least, is causally relevant to—S’s 
subsequent recollection of the event, Rx. 
 
There are two points I would like to extract from Martin and Deutscher’s analysis. First, their paper 
brought causation back into the analysis of memory by way of pointing out the explanatory 
indispensability of the causal condition. Unfortunately, this point isn’t stressed enough, partly 
because Martin and Deutscher’s own analysis suggests that CC is simply the conclusion of the 
following modus tollens: 
 
Argument 1: 
 
(P1) If S’s Rx is not caused by Ex, then S is not Rx-ing (Assumption) 
(P2)  But S is Rx-ing (as evidenced by their thought experiments) 
(C)  Therefore, S’s Rx is caused by Ex. 
 
But notice that this interpretation may render their argument vacuous. As stated, P1 implies its 
contrapositive:  
 
*(P1) If S is Rx-ing, then S is caused by Ex 
 
which is precisely the conditional they want to prove. But, of course, Martin and Deustcher should 
not want that, for if P1 is supposed to be an assumption, then the argument shouldn’t prove what 
they assumed to begin with.  
I think a better interpretation is to treat their argument inductively, so that the thought 
experiments they discuss are to be accommodated by an IBE. Consider one of their well-known 
thought experiments. A painter is asked to draw an imagined rural landscape. When he’s done, his 
parents recognize the painting as depicting the view from the house they used to live in many years 
ago. The painter, who has no recollections of the time they lived in such house, claims to have 
imagined the scene he painted. However, the intuition this thought experiment is supposed to 
elicit—and let’s assume that it does for the sake of argument—is that the painter is actually 
painting the scene from memory and not from imagination. Notice that Martin and Deuschter’s 
claim is that we take the painter’s envisioning the scene while painting it as a case of remembering 
(as opposed to imagination) because the “only reasonable explanation” for his mentally 
entertaining that precise scene at t3 is his having experienced it at t1, even if he did not remember 
it at all during t2. Thus, if we take their argument to be an IBE, then CC would enter as the 
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hypothesis that best fits the data provided by the thought experiment. Here is the argument, 
schematically:20 
 
Argument 2: 
 
(P1)  The painter’s case is clearly an instance of recollection. 
(P2)  The hypothesis CC, if true, would explain why the painter’s case is an instance of 
recollection. 
(P3)  No other hypotheses can explain why the painter’s case is an instance of recollection as 
well as CC does. 
(C)  Therefore, CC is (probably) true. 
 
If this is the case, then the appeal to CC is the result of an IBE, as opposed to the conclusion of a 
deductively valid argument. 
 The second point I’d like to extract from Martin and Deutscher’s analysis is that the 
existence of memory traces is supposed to follow, as a matter of course, from the acceptance of 
CC (Martin and Deutscher 1966: 189). Their argument, which is not terribly straightforward in 
their paper, can be reconstructed as follows:21  
 
Argument 3: 
 
(P1)  S’s Ex is diachronically separated from S’s Rx.  
(P2)  A cause cannot be diachronically separated from its effect (i.e., there is no causation at a 
temporal distance). 
(MTC) Therefore, there must be an intermediary causal connection, Mx, between Ex and Rx such 
that Ex is the proximal cause of Mx and Mx is the proximal cause of Rx.  
 
But notice, once again, that the argument for MTC hinges on an IBE. The idea is that the 
postulation of memory traces as causal intermediaries between Ex and Rx allows us to preserve 
CC without having to accept the metaphysically uncomfortable claim that there is causation at a 
temporal distance. In other words: memory traces become theoretical posits postulated to help 
explain the causal connection between an experience, Ex, and its recollection, Rx, without having 
to accept action at a temporal distance. Thus, Malcolm tells us: 
 
Presumably the reader will know that memory traces are not entities, states, or processes that 
neural surgeons have discovered in the course of their investigations of the brain, as dentists 
discover cavities. The memory trace is what may be called “a theoretical construct”. It is 
something that is inferred to exist from the presence of things that unquestionably exist, such 
as learned skills, habits, and occurrences of recognition and remembering.22  
 
It is worth remarking that, at least for Malcolm, memory traces are postulated in virtue of our 
“abhorrence of ‘action at a distance’—in this case, action at a temporal distance”.23 Memory traces 
are conceived as playing the role of “bringing about a memory response: [for] without the existence 
of a trace there would be a gap in a causal chain and causal action would occur at a temporal 
distance”.24 In brief, the motivation behind the postulation of a memory trace as a theoretical posit 
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is the fact that it constitutes a better explanation of how Ex causes Rx than the alternative action-
at-a-temporal distance account in which Ex directly causes Rx.  
 The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it leaves open the following possibility: 
when it comes to explaining how Rx came about as a result of Ex, an explanation involving action 
at a temporal distance could be at least as good as an explanation involving memory traces. This 
is precisely Malcolm’s important move in his 1977 book Memory and Mind. His argument, which 
is reminiscent of Russell’s defense of mnemic causation, is that the kind of explanation we usually 
invoke when talking about remembering does not imply, in any way, that there should be a process 
mediating Ex and Rx. Suppose—to use one of his examples—that you tell someone that you saw 
a boat capsize last week. Now imagine that, for whatever reason, your interlocutor is in disbelief: 
‘How do you know that?’ she asks, to which you reply, ‘I know because I saw it happen’.25 The 
thought here is that in explaining how it is that you remember the boat capsizing, you are applying 
a causal claim, just as Martin and Deutscher argued, but it makes no reference to any sort of causal 
process or state mediating the event perceived and your recollection of it. As a matter of fact, it 
makes no sense to ask whether you are certain that there was an ongoing causal process between 
your witnessing the boat’s capsizing and your relating the story. 
 
The strange, irrelevant character of this question shows that there is a familiar use of causal 
language consisting of such ordinary locutions as “because of”, “due to”, “the cause of”, and 
the more technical “necessary causal condition”, which carries no implication of a causal 
process filling up the temporal space between the occurrence of a cause of x and the 
occurrence of x. We can agree with Martin and Deutscher that the language of memory does, 
in a sense, require a “causal interpretation”, but not agree that memory as a causal concept 
entails the concept of causal process […] Eliminate the assumption of a causal process, and 
the causal argument for a memory trace collapses.26 
 
In sum, Malcolm argues that one can accept CC without having to postulate memory traces. Causal 
explanations involving action at a temporal distance are—according to him—perfectly reasonable 
explanations for recollection, and nothing about intermediate causal processes is implied by our 
use of the concept of remembering. While CC may be an IBE as to how Ex causes Rx, one does 
not need to accept the second IBE in which memory traces are postulated; explanations involving 
action at a temporal distance are as good as those involving memory traces. In the next section, 
however, I argue that they are not. 
 
4. The explanatory indispensability of memory traces 
In the previous section I claimed that the appeal to memory traces stemmed from the 
realization that their postulation was required to come up with the best possible explanation as to 
how an experience, Ex, causes its recollection, Rx. After all, the assumption of causally mediating 
memory traces avoided the uncomfortable metaphysical pitfalls of causation at a temporal 
distance. Malcolm’s anti-realist reply, however, was that one could accept the claim that Ex causes 
Rx without having to be committed to causally mediating memory traces, simply because 
explanations involving action at a temporal distance are equally good explanations for 
remembering. As a result, the postulation of memory traces as theoretical entities for an adequate 
account of remembering was thought to be unnecessary, and the idea of trying to find them 
empirically was deemed unwarranted. With this move, Malcolm made anti-realism about memory 
traces, once again, an attractive theory in the philosophy of memory.27 
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Notice, though, that Malcolm is not arguing in favor of the possibility of action at a 
temporal distance as a metaphysical claim. Whether or not a cause can bring about an effect after 
a temporal gap is irrelevant to Malcolm’s argument. His point, just like Martin and Deutscher’s, 
is about causal explanation. After all, he accepts the IBE motivated by ‘Argument 2.’ What he 
rejects is the IBE motivated by ‘Argument 3.’ And he rejects it, not because he denies P2 as a 
metaphysical claim, but rather because he denies that the acceptance or rejection of causation at a 
temporal distance has anything to do with successful causal explanations for the phenomenon of 
recollection. 28  In other words, he does not think that the postulation of intermediary causal 
processes adds anything to our account of how Rx was brought about as a result of Ex.  
This, however, is what I think Malcolm gets wrong, for I am not sure how explanations 
involving action at a temporal distance can really satisfy our explanatory necessities when it comes 
to various causally relevant questions about memory and remembering. If we only care about 
experiences causing successful recollections, as Martin, Deutscher, and Malcolm do, maybe a case 
can be made to the effect that action at a temporal distance is all we need to accept in order to 
furnish satisfactory causal psychological explanations. But successful recollection is not the only 
thing we care about when we demand causal explanations for our memories. We often want to 
know, for instance, why is it that a person, having experienced an event, can nonetheless fail to 
remember it. Additionally, we may want to know why, given that a subject experienced a particular 
event, she only managed to remember part of it, or why she remembered it distortedly. Moreover, 
sometimes we wonder whether it is possible to facilitate or to hamper our subsequent recollection 
of an event after having witnessed it. To put it succinctly, we often wonder whether it is possible 
to intervene in the alleged causal connection between an experience, Ex, and is subsequent 
recollection, Rx.  
Let me offer an analogy to drive my point home. Consider a case in which someone 
consumes cyanide at t1 and then dies at t3. A natural way of describing the event is to say that the 
person died as a result of her consuming cyanide—that the ingestion of cyanide caused her death. 
If all we want to know is why she died at t3, alluding to her consuming cyanide at t1 may be a 
sufficient explanation. The same goes for remembering. As I stressed, Malcolm’s examples (as 
well as Martin and Deutscher’s) only pertain to successful recollections of past events. After all, 
the motivation behind the IBE that leads to the acceptance of CC is simply that we cannot make 
sense of a particular successful memory retrieval behavior at t3 unless we accept as its cause having 
the relevant experience at t1. A similar IBE is at work when, upon seeing a dead body exhibiting 
the distinctive signs of cyanide poisoning, a coroner alludes to the person’s prior ingestion of 
cyanide as a causal explanation of his death. In such a case, asking the coroner whether or not he’s 
certain that a causal process was going on between the person’s ingestion of the cyanide and his 
eventual death would seem as awkward as asking whether or not you are certain that a causal 
process was going on between your witnessing an event and your recalling it afterwards. Here, 
alluding to your having witnessed a boat capsizing—to borrow Malcolm’s example—may be 
enough of an explanation as to why you remember it, the same way in which alluding to cyanide 
ingestion may be enough of an explanation for the person’s death.  
But suppose that, right next to the dead body, there is another person who also ingested 
cyanide but failed to die. Let’s assume that she exhibited some of the symptoms—shortness of 
breath and pink skin color—but none of the lethal ones, like pulmonary edema and cardiac arrest. 
Again, in this case, cyanide ingestion can explain the person’s symptoms. For example, if someone 
asks why her skin is pink, one can rightly say that it is due to her having ingested cyanide. But 
then an obvious question arises: given that both subjects ingested cyanide, why is it that only one 
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of them died while the other failed to die? Now, I take it, talk of intermediary causal processes 
becomes necessary. The only way in which one can explain why, given the same initial conditions, 
one person died while the other person failed to die, is by way of alluding to some difference in 
the causal process that occurred between the cyanide ingestion and the subsequent symptomatic 
behavior. One possibility is that the person who survived had increased levels of 
hydroxocobalamin in her blood due to, say, excessive consumption of vitamin B12. As a result, the 
ingested cyanide preferentially bonded molecules of hydroxocobalamin, leaving the hemoglobin’s 
cytochrome oxidase less affected—which would explain why her levels of blood oxygenation were 
enough to elicit shortness of breath and skin coloring but not lethal pulmonary or cardiac arrest. 
There are other possibilities too. The point, though, is that when it comes to explaining the 
differential effects of cyanide ingestion in these two people, any successful causal explanation is 
going to involve intermediary causal processes. 
The same is true in the case of memory. Consider a small modification of Malcolm’s 
example. Suppose that you weren’t alone when you witnessed the boat capsizing. You were with 
your friend Mary. Both you and Mary were side by side when the event occurred, both of you were 
looking at the event, and both of you have roughly the same visual acuity. However, only you 
remember the event later on. Now, when you wonder why is it that you remember the event while 
Mary fails to remember the same event, even when both of you witnessed it, appealing to an 
intermediary causal process is the natural way to proceed. One may say, for instance, that Mary 
wasn’t paying attention, or that she has difficulties consolidating information from short- to long-
term memory, or perhaps that she has seen so many boats capsizing lately that she cannot 
remember just that one. Of course, one may allude to some more “organic” explanations; one may 
say, for instance, that Mary was given an amnestic drug right after she witnessed the event, or that 
she suffers from some kind of neurodegenerative disease, or even that her medial temporal lobes 
were damaged at some point after having witnessed the boat capsizing. Whatever the story we tell, 
it is going to involve a reference to intermediate causal processes that differed between her case 
and yours.  
Notice that the point I am making does not hinge on our knowledge of the neural 
mechanisms by means of which memories get consolidated and further retrieved—that part of the 
story will come later. My point so far is about the necessity of alluding to intermediate causal 
processes in order to reach the best causal explanation of an unsuccessful—versus a successful—
case of remembering. In other words, a causal explanation that does not make reference to 
intermediate causal processes won’t be able to account for the differential effects between cases 
of successful and unsuccessful recollection. This means that, when it comes to accounting for 
differential effects during recollection, a causal explanation that does not involve intermediate 
causal processes won’t be as good a causal explanation as one involving intermediate causal 
processes. Thus, Malcolm is wrong when claiming that, when it comes to recollection, 
explanations involving action at a temporal distance are explanatorily on par with those that posit 
intermediate processes. 
To be sure, this argument can also be made when the differential effect involves 
improved—as opposed to impaired—recollection. Suppose that Mary did not fail to remember the 
witnessed event but she actually remembered it better than you did. Unlike you, she remembered—
let’s say—that there was a red fender on the starboard side when the boat capsized. Again, other 
things being equal, any successful explanation is going to involve some reference to intermediate 
causal processes that differed between you and Mary. These processes can be as simple as closely 
attending to the fender while witnessing the event, or as complex as having received a dose of 
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strychnine—shown to enhance memory retention in some mammals29—right after seeing the boat 
capsizing. I think the same goes for other differential effects, not only between subjects but also 
within subjects. For example, someone may adduce lack of sleep when trying to explain why she 
failed at a particular test that later on, after a good night of sleep, she can pass with no trouble. The 
fact of the matter is that we often allude to intermediate causal processes when we offer 
explanations of differential effects in recollection.  
Malcolm is wrong, then, in thinking that causal explanations involving action at a temporal 
distance are explanatorily equivalent to those involving intermediate causal processing. He isn’t 
entirely to blame, though. The root of the problem, I think, lies in interpreting CC as stating that a 
reference to Ex may be a sufficient condition for explaining how Rx came about. Martin and 
Deutscher also share this assumption, for they appeal to memory traces via the second IBE stated 
in Argument 2—the second premise of which Malcolm rejects. But this is the wrong way to 
introduce memory traces. What Martin and Deutscher should have said is that CC and memory 
traces are a package deal. More precisely, what they should have said is that appealing to the past 
event Ex alone does not constitute the best causal explanation for Rx (save, perhaps, in the very 
circumscribed and highly under-described cases of successful recollection that Malcolm 
discusses). The past event is part of the causal explanation, but on most occasions, as in the cases 
of differential effects just discussed, the appeal to memory traces is also required, not as a fallout 
of accepting the past event as the cause of Rx, but as a resource to explain the psychological 
phenomenon itself. I suggest, therefore, to modify CC in favor of a causal condition that 
incorporates memory traces: 
 
(CC*)  S’s experience of a particular event x, Ex, plus a memory trace of x, Mx, cause—or, at least, 
are causally relevant to—S’s subsequent recollection of the event, Rx. 
  
At this point, it is then worth asking how and when do memory traces become causally relevant 
when it comes to explanations of differential effects on recollection. I suggest an answer to these 
questions in the next section. 
 
5. Intervening memory 
In the previous section I argued, contra Malcolm, that memory traces become 
indispensable to explain differential effects in recollection, and that causal explanations that do 
not appeal to intermediary causal mechanisms are not as good as those that do. I now want to 
suggest that a promising strategy to understand how and when memory traces become 
indispensable to account for differential effects on recollection; this strategy involves relying on 
Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation.30 According to his view, causes are considered 
devices for manipulating and controlling effects. Causal explanations explain because they convey 
information about the way in which one could potentially manipulate or control a certain effect by 
intervening on a previous event we take to be its cause. Thus, successful causal explanations are 
used to answer what Woodward calls “what-if-things-had-been-different” questions: “the 
explanation must enable us to see what sort of difference it would have made for the explanandum 
if the factors cited in the explanans had been different in various possible ways”.31 In the case of 
cyanide poisoning, for instance, understanding why one person died while the other one survived 
requires understanding what it is that we could have done in the case of the person that died to 
affect the result that occurred in the case of the person who did not die. In other words, we want 
to know whether there was something one could have done between t1 and t3 to prevent her death. 
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Might it have been possible that even though she ingested cyanide at t1 we could have done 
something at t2 in order to prevent her death at t3?  
As it turns out, there are ways in which one can prevent death by cyanide poisoning. For 
instance, we know that cyanide, when dissolved in water, inhibits cytochrome oxidase blocking 
electron transport, which in turn decreases the amount of oxygen in the blood. This condition 
causes lactic acidosis, whereby the pH of the hemoglobin is reduced and it starts building up D-
lactate, which rapidly damages organic tissue—especially in our lungs and stomach—thus leading 
to one’s death. As a result, a person’s death after ingesting cyanide is potentially preventable at 
several points during the process. Most typically, one could administer nitrites to turn hemoglobin 
into methahemoglobin, which is preferentially bonded by the cyanide. The bonding of cyanide and 
methahemoglobin creates cyanmethahemoglobin, which in turn can be treated with sodium 
thiosulfate to convert the cyanmethahemoglobin into hemoglobin, sulfites, and thiocyanate, the 
last of which can be secreted through urine without further damage to the organism. However, 
other possible manipulations could be potentially implemented, like the use of hydroxocobalamins 
to artificially increase the pH level in the hemoglobin while eliminating the cyanide, or by finding 
a mechanism to inhibit the creation of D-lactate.  
The relevant point is that these interventions—some of which are in fact implemented in 
medical facilities (like the use of nitrites) and some of which are merely potential (like the use of 
some chemical agent that could reduce the hemoglobin’s pH)—allow us to manipulate the buildup 
of D-lactate. When the levels of D-lactate in the blood reach a certain threshold, a body enters into 
the physiological condition known as lactic acidosis, which can be lethal. But if one can reduce 
the levels of D-lactate, lactic acidosis is then prevented and the chances of survival increase. 
Therefore, according to the manipulation account I am relying on, the immediate cause of death in 
the cyanide poisoning case just described is the amount of D-lactate in the person’s blood. We can 
tell that because we know that had we intervened to reduce the level of D-lactate in the blood, the 
person would have merely experienced shortness of breath and skin discoloration.  
Let me put it graphically. As I described the case above (see Figure 1A), there are two 
different events, B (death via cardiac arrest) and C (skin discoloration), which appeared to have 
been caused by the same event A (cyanide consumption). However, as I argued, if we limit our 
causal explanation to A, the differential effect would remain mysterious. So, we wonder whether 
some other event D happened between the time t1 in which A occurred and the time t3 in which 
both B and C occurred, such that it could explain the differential effect. As it turns out, there is: 
lactic acidosis. We know that D is the cause of B because we can intervene, I, on D and prevent 
the buildup of D-lactate, thus manipulating the effect and ‘switching’, as it were, the causal path 
from B to C (Figure 1B). 
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Figure 1: 1A) Graphical models of an acyclic causal graph with one cause and two possible effects. 1B) 
Graphical model of a manipulation on an intervening factor. 
 
The same, I surmise, occurs with memory. The suggested variation on Malcolm’s case 
unveils a differential effect between a situation in which one remembers the event, B, and situation 
in which one does not remember the event, C, despite the fact that in both situations one has 
experienced the initial event, A. As in the case of the cyanide poisoning, appealing merely to 
having witnessed the event does not explain the differential effect. So we wonder whether there is 
an intermediate event, D, such that a proper intervention, I, upon it could switch the causal chain 
from B to C. In other words, we want to know whether there is an intermediate causal mechanism 
that could explain why one person remembered or failed to remember a particular event. And we 
could know that with the appropriate intervention. Enter neuroscience. 
 
6. Memory traces as multi-level neural mechanisms 
In the last section, I suggested an interpretation of the role of memory traces in causal 
explanations of remembering in terms of Woodward’s manipulability theory of causation. Now I 
would like to suggest a mechanistic model for memory traces that can provide a framework for 
understanding the way in which certain experimental manipulations conducted by cognitive 
neuroscientists have actually produced—and could possibly produce—differential effects in 
recollection. Since this interpretation is largely inspired by Craver’s account of multi-level neural 
mechanisms,32 it is useful to explain what he means by such terms. 
According to Craver, a mechanism is a set of entities and activities arranged in specific 
ways to produce regular changes in a period of time.33 By ‘neural mechanism,’ therefore, I will 
refer to the sorts of mechanisms studied in neuroscience. Neural mechanisms typically include 
entities such as neurons, neurotransmitters, oligodendrocytes, hippocampi, brains, etc. They also 
include activities such as neuronal firing, enzyme release, information processing, brain region 
activation, etc. The entities and the activities composing neural mechanisms have spatial and 
temporal organizations that are essential for the mechanism to perform its operations. Finally, the 
ways in which the mechanism’s entities and activities are organized typically compose hierarchies. 
Each strata of the mechanistic hierarchy is usually called a ‘level,’ so mechanisms that can be 
decomposed into more than one level are ‘multi-level mechanisms’. 
As an illustration of a multi-level neural mechanism, consider Craver’s example of a 
mechanistic decomposition of spatial memory in four levels (Figure 2). Each level is the object of 
study of a relatively independent sub-discipline in the neurosciences, as each level is investigated 
with a distinctive array of experimental methods. The top level includes entities such as organisms 
(e.g., mice, humans) and surrounding environments, as well as activities such as discrimination, 
button pressing and swimming. At this level, experimental psychologists, cognitive ethologists, 
and comparative psychologists study spatial memory using experimental methods like the Morris 
water maze, radial arm mazes and virtual reality computers. In the second level (one level down) 
we find entities such as the hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex, as well as computational 
activities such as informational transfer and spatial map formation. This level is usually studied by 
cognitive neuroscientists and neuropsychologists via experimental methods such as event related 
potentials (ERP), functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography 
(PET) scans, and several diagnosis assessment methodologies often implemented in clinical 
settings. The relevance of the hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex—that is, the entities of the 
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second level—is determined by their dependence on the entities and the activities of the third level. 
This level includes entities such as granule and pyramidal cells, and activities such as neuronal 
firing and depolarization. Neurophysiologists and, to some extent, neuroanatomists, study this 
mechanistic level with experimental methods such as intra- and extra-cellular recording, cell body 
staining, track tracing, and, sometimes, very localized neuropharmacological interventions, like 
optogenetics and microiontophoresis, whereby the researcher injects small dosages of particular 
chemical compounds directly into the neural tissue. Finally, the bottom level consists of molecular 
mechanisms that include entities such as N-Methyl D-aspartic (NMDA) receptors and Mg2+ ions, 
and activities such as binding and electron releases. Molecular neurobiologists study this level 
using experimental methods such as pharmacological interventions and gene knockouts.34 
Although an oversimplification, Craver’s spatial memory example highlights an essential 
feature of any multi-level neural mechanism—including, as I suggest, memory traces. Craver calls 
it mutual manipulability, and it basically specifies a condition of sufficiency for a component to 
be a part of a multi-level mechanism. According to the mutual manipulability condition, “a part is 
a component of a mechanism if one can change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole by 
intervening to change the component and one can change the behavior of the component by 
intervening to change the behavior of the mechanism as a whole.”35 For example, we can tell that 
LTP in the pyramidal cells in region CA1 of a rat’s hippocampus is part of the multi-level neural 
mechanism of the organism’s spatial memory because we can intervene upon its mechanistic 
operations—by removing NMDA receptors in this location, for instance—thus inhibiting the 
activity of the place cells and making it impossible for the hippocampus to form spatial maps. 
Conversely, we can alter the induction of LTP in CA1 by way of intervening higher neural levels, 
e.g., severing afferent neural tracts or modifying the rat’s behavior. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Multi-level neural mechanism of spatial memory (from Craver and Darden, 2013). 
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With the conceptual scaffolding of the mechanistic account, we can go back to our 
discussion about the existence of memory traces and ask whether there is a multi-level neural 
mechanism one can intervene upon in order to bring about differential effects in recollection. Since 
most interventionist techniques in neuroscience are relatively new—particularly those that afford 
controlled manipulations at specific mechanistic levels—the precise nature of such a mechanism 
is currently poorly understood. However, there are number of experimental results that can help to 
reveal its structure. First, consider manipulations at the molecular level. In a classic study, Flexner 
and colleagues (1963) injected intracerebrally several kinds of protein synthesis inhibitors in the 
hippocampi of stimuli-conditioned mice. They discovered that graded amounts of puromycin 
would impair the consolidation of recently acquired stimulus information. Unlike other 
pharmacological compounds used as control agents, Flexner and colleagues’ discovery unveiled 
that when peptide transfer is disrupted in the ribosome of hippocampal cells, memory 
consolidation is impaired. This important experiment revealed part of the molecular level of 
memory traces by manipulating a specific component and bringing about a differential effect in 
recollection. Ever since, different pharmacological and genetic manipulations have been used, and 
although we are far from distinguishing the neural mechanism underlying an event-specific 
memory trace, recent manipulations looking at differential effects in content-specific memory 
traces suggest that the search is promising. Recently, Fellini and collaborators showed that NMDA 
receptors in another area of the hippocampus, CA3, are essential for pattern recognition tasks but 
not for spatial task, showing that controlled manipulations at the molecular level can illuminate 
the structure of content-specific memory traces.36 Finally, parallel developments have occurred in 
the field of optogenetics, a revolutionary new technique that is enabling researchers to manipulate 
neuronal activity with light. Using optogenetics, researchers have been able to selectively turn 
neurons on and off in specific regions of the hippocampus, effectively switching the behavior of 
fear-conditioned rodents from active to inactive fear-conditioned behavior.37  
Manipulations at the neurophysiological level have also shed light on the neural 
components of content-specific memory traces. The story begins with a widely cited study by 
Duncan (1949), in which he showed that electroconvulsive treatment (ECT) could impair the 
consolidation of recently acquired information—a finding that has been corroborated 
extensively.38 Unfortunately, the effects of ECT are quite massive, and the precise reasons as to 
why they affect memory consolidation are unclear. Many neuroscientists hypothesize that ECT 
interrupts protein synthesis temporarily, which in turn affects the polarization of the cell 
membranes blocking the transport of neurotransmitters. 39  Fortunately, the depolarization 
component of the electroconvulsive shocks can now be isolated with the use of transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS), a non-invasive experimental technique in which a rapidly changing 
magnetic field sends off a weak electric current to a specific region in the cerebral cortex in order 
to produce a localized depolarization. Although seldom used in the context of memory given the 
difficulty of stimulating the medial temporal lobes, recent studies have explored the way in which 
depolarization affects memory retrieval. In a recent study, for example, Kohler and collaborators 
(2004) employed repetitive TMS to stimulate regions in the left inferior pre-frontal cortex 
(LIPFC), which were previously associated with successful encoding of the studied material (using 
the subsequent-memory paradigm, which I explain below). Participants who were stimulated in 
the LIPFC showed higher accuracy for encoded words relative to both non-stimulated subjects and 
non-LIPFC stimulated subjects. Since it appears that repetitive TMS above 5 Hz transiently 
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increases cortical excitability40—an effect that parallels LTP—Kohler et al.’s study suggests that 
electric activity in the LIPFC is part of the mechanism underlying semantic memories.  
Even more promising dissociations can be observed when we scale up a level. With the 
advent of non-invasive neuroimaging techniques, cognitive neuroscientists are starting to identify 
brain regions that are differentially involved during content-specific memory retrieval. Two 
important lines of evidence are of particular interest here. The first line of evidence pertains to 
findings employing the subsequent memory paradigm.41 In this paradigm, participants are asked 
to memorize content-specific stimuli (e.g., words, pictures, etc.) while in the MRI scanner. The 
recorded brain activity during encoding is then compared with the participant’s responses for 
subsequently remembered versus forgotten stimuli. The use of the subsequent memory paradigm 
in cognitive neuroscience has revealed a network of interrelated brain regions, whose engagement 
plays a critical role during the consolidation of memory traces effectively leading to the 
recollection of particular episodes. 42  The other line of research pertains to one of the most 
consistent results in the research on the cognitive neuroscience of memory: remembering re-
activates the sensory areas that were involved during the encoding of the retrieved material.43 The 
extent to which content-specific sensory cortices engaged during encoding are re-activated during 
retrieval has only recently started being studied. Still, the results from these studies consistently 
show that visual information selectively re-activates visual cortices, auditory information 
selectively reactivates auditory cortices, and olfactory information selectively reactivates the 
olfactory cortices.44  
One final line of evidence that speaks to the nature of the top mechanistic level of memory 
traces comes from neuropsychology. Departing from the observation that visual cortices were 
engaged during retrieval of visual memories, cognitive neuropsychologists David Rubin and 
Daniel Greenberg studied the nature of memory deficits associated with selective damage in the 
visual cortex.45 They observed that, consistent with the sensory reactivation hypothesis, patients 
with damage in the visual cortex have trouble remembering visual details of previously encoded 
events, leading to what is now called visual memory-deficit amnesia. 46  Importantly, the 
psychological manifestation of the visual memory-deficit amnesia differs from the typical medial-
temporal amnesia—such as H.M.’s—in that it only affects visual information; episodic 
information encoded non-visually or amodally (e.g., names) is spared. Brain lesions do not 
constitute direct manipulations, however, for it is hard to say whether a particular patient would 
have remembered a specific stimulus had she not suffered the brain lesion. A more controlled 
experiment would be called for. For instance, combining the subsequent memory paradigm and 
the TMS techniques reviewed above, cognitive neuroscientists could localize those brain regions 
preferentially engaged during the successful encoding of different stimuli (say, faces and houses), 
and then, during retrieval, they could selectively TMS each region. One would expect, therefore, 
that if the brain region that gets activated during successful encoding of a particular face, x, is part 
of its memory trace, then by magnetically stimulating that very region one could control whether 
or not the subject successfully remembers having seen x. As such, this would be direct evidence 
to the effect that there is an intermediary causal mechanism between the successful encoding of an 
event (Ex) (i.e., seeing face x), and its subsequent remembering (Rx)—or failing to remember (not-
Rx)—the event. Such an intervention—to go back to the discussion of the previous section—would 
allow the cognitive neuroscientist to “switch” the causal path from B to C, as illustrated in Fig. 1B. 
In sum, the few studies I just surveyed offer us a picture of the ways in which 
neuroscientists have manipulated, and could manipulate, memory traces at different levels. The 
putative mutual manipulability of memory traces requires that interventions done at one level 
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affect the organization of the other levels. The fact that blocking NMDA receptors but not M2 
receptors affects subsequent retrieval of content-specific memories 47  tells us that NMDA 
receptors, but not M2 receptors, are a part of that memory’s trace. Likewise, if depolarizing the 
right occipital face area (rOFA) but not the right lateral occipital area (rLO) during recognition 
selectively impairs one’s recognition of a particular face, this intervention would tell us that that 
the rOFA, but not the rLO, would be part of the memory trace of that face.48 Taken together, the 
results of these studies are starting to give us a picture of the neural underpinnings of memory 
traces that resembles the multi-level structure of the causal mechanisms involved in cyanide 
poisoning. Suitable interventions at the right level of the neural mechanisms composing memory 
traces may give us the differential effects in recollection that the anti-realist was unable to explain.  
 
7. Objections, and (quick) rebuttals 
There are, of course, a number of ways one could challenge the current proposal. In this 
section I will briefly reply to three possible objections. A first objection stems from the fact that 
Woodward’s manipulationist account of causation has difficulty accommodating preemption.49 To 
understand how this concern applies to the case of memory traces, consider again Figure 1B. Here, 
the thought is that a proper intervention, I, would help to clarify whether or not D is part of the 
causal path to B. If we take B to be Rx, and C to be not-Rx, then showing that I switches from B to 
C suggests that D is (at least part of) Mx. But if D stands for a multi-level mechanism, then any 
intervention on D will really be an intervention on a putative causal path between variables inside 
D. Graphically, the actual model should look more like Figure 3A. Here, X, Y and Z are variables 
that stand in place of entities at some level of description of D (i.e., Mx). The intervention may 
block the causal path from X to Y, “switching it” instead to Z, which in turn causes C, rather than 
B. Suppose—to make this model more concrete and related to the previous section—that Y stands 
for NMDA receptors, Z for M2 receptors, and that I represents an intervention on the process of 
glutamate binding from afferent neurons projecting onto CA3. The problem, however, is that there 
could be a common factor, P, that can directly cause X, Y, and Z, and which the intervention, I, 
cannot rule out, even though it could have brought about Y, and thus B (Figure 3B). Such a result, 
therefore, would undercut our reason to believe that X is part of the causal path—the memory 
trace—for B. More concretely, it is possible that there could be a background factor that could 
enable the passing of positively charged ions through the cell membrane even if one were to block 
glutamate binding to NMDA receptors. If this were the case, we would be less compelled to say 
that NMDA receptors are part of the multi-level neural mechanism that composes the memory 
trace for Rx.  
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Figure 3: Graphical depiction of the problem of preemption for an interventionist model of memory traces. 
 
I can think of two replies to this objection. A first, easy reply is simply burden-shifting: 
preemption is a problem for pretty much every theory of causation, so it is no more a problem for 
my preferred framework than it is for any other causal view. But a second, perhaps more 
interesting, reply is to point out that this is a case in which a difficulty in principle turns out to be 
an opportunity in practice. More precisely, while I agree that, in principle, the causal role of a 
common factor such as P would be missed by the intervention on the path from X to Y, for the 
practical purpose of identifying the memory trace that mediates A—i.e., Ex—and B—i.e., Rx—the 
question as to whether or not P is part of the multi-level neural mechanism simply becomes an 
empirical hypothesis. After all, our goal as scientists seeking to explain the causal structure of a 
memory trace, Mx, is precisely to uncover the causal net that links Ex to Rx. If our inquiry suggests 
that there is a reason to believe that P, and not X, is really part of Mx, then a suitable intervention 
on P would be the best way to test that hypothesis out. And since my proposal here is that, as a 
matter of empirical inquiry, we can think of memory traces as multi-level neural mechanisms 
within a manipulationist framework, concerns about common factors can be then assuaged by 
pointing out that they, too, can be subject to experimental manipulation.  
A second objection is to suggest that I have misinterpreted Malcolm, and that one should 
read him as being concerned with a notion of remembering that covers only cases of successful 
recollection. As such, cases of unsuccessful recollection would not—according to this reading—
fall under the concept of remembering Malcolm is concerned with. My response is that it is unclear 
how to delimit cases of successful, as opposed to unsuccessful, recollection. Consider another 
modified version of Malcolm’s case of the boat capsizing. Al, Bea, and Cory witness the boat 
capsizing. Upon retrieval, Al remembers that the boat capsized and that the tip of the bow was red 
but can’t recall whether the vessel flipped on its starboard or port side. Bea recalls that the boat 
capsized and that the tip of the bow was red, but falsely remembers that it flipped portside—it 
actually flipped on its starboard side. Finally, Cory remembers the boat capsizing, that it flipped 
on its starboard side, but falsely remembers that the tip of the bow was purple, not red. Who 
remembers the event successfully? One possibility is: nobody! They all got some detail either 
missing or wrong. Alas, if this was the case, most of our memories would be unsuccessful. We 
always miss some details of past events. Another possibility is to say that only Al remembers the 
event successfully, as his memory did not include falsehoods, only gaps. But doesn’t it look like 
failing to conjure up the fact that a whole boat flipped on one of its sides is worse than 
misremembering that it did it rightwards versus leftwards, and isn’t this mistake worse than 
misremembering the little detail that the bow was red and not purple? True, unlike Al’s, both Bea 
and Cory’s memories are false, but in some way they seem more accurate than Al’s. Of course, 
what I’m trying to do with this case is to highlight well-known difficulties with the notions of truth, 
accuracy, and fidelity as they apply to episodic memory.50 The fact that our episodic memories are 
not exact replicas of past experiences, and that a certain amount of distortion and forgetting is 
perfectly normal, is a well-accepted fact in the science of memory and, thankfully, in contemporary 
philosophy of mind. Unfortunately, this very fact makes the distinction between successful and 
unsuccessful remembering unclear, and thus unlikely that people operate with two entirely distinct 
concepts of remembering. 
Finally, someone may offer a third objection to my manipulationist framework on account 
that many memory interventions that result in differential effects on recollection occur at the 
psychological and/or behavioral rather than at neural level. For instance, effects of divided 
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attention during encoding, or imagination inflation and misinformation at retrieval,51 are well 
known cases of psychological interventions that bring about differential effects on recollection, 
even though they are not directly intervening the causal chain between Ex and Rx at the neural 
level. Prima facie, this objection is easily dismissible: given that I embrace the principle of mutual 
manipulability for multi-level mechanisms, all these effects ultimately are due to some change in 
the underlying neural structure. The fact that these interventions can be easily describable at the 
psychological or behavioral level does not mean that the underlying neural mechanisms are 
explanatorily inert. However, there is another concern in the vicinity of this objection, which has 
been recently articulated by Sarah Robins. 52  The concern here is reminiscent of the old 
philosophical distinction between the content and the vehicle of a mental representation. Memory 
traces, as we saw in section 2, are supposed to carry intentional content; Mx is about x. The vehicles 
of these contents, I have argued, are multi-level neural mechanisms. The problem is that current 
neuroscience tells us that neural mechanisms are in constant change; they undergo all sorts of 
dynamic changes through time.53 If so, how can we attribute stability to an intentional content 
whose vehicle is dynamically changing through time? Moreover, how can an intervention in an 
everchanging vehicle predictably produce changes in the intentional content it supposedly carries? 
I think this concern is spot on, and my take is that it should force us to reconsider the retention and 
the isomorphism conditions mentioned in section 2. Doing so is, alas, beyond the scope of the 
current paper. Yet, it is a critical task if we want to understand the nature of memory traces, since, 
as I have argued, they continue to be explanatorily indispensable. 
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employed as theoretical entities, that is, as devices introduced in the context of a theory to explain some 
more accessible phenomenon. The status of the concept of memory trace is like that of equator or center of 
gravity. And when memory traces are taken to be theoretical constructs, to find fault with the theory of 
memory traces is to cast doubt on our need to postulate traces in order to account for remembering.” 
23. Malcolm 1977: p. 174. 
24. Malcolm 1977: p. 179, emphasis in the original. 
25. Malcolm 1977: p. 183. 
26. Malcolm 1977: 185. 
27. Coincidentally, the idea that memory traces may not be required for a successful explanation of how Rx 
can be brought about by Ex also received some attention in psychology, as it constituted the backbone of 
the ecological approach to remembering (Gibson 1979; Turvey & Shaw 1979; Michaels & Carello 1981). 
Much of what I say here could easily apply to this view. For a nice criticism of the ecological approach to 
memory, which I find very congenial to the spirit of this paper, see Sutton 1998, part IV. 
28. To put it à la van Fraassen 1980: for Malcolm, an explanation involving action at a temporal distance 
is all one needs to save the phenomenon of recollection, so there is no reason to believe in the reality of the 
intermediary unobservable events supposedly referred by our notion of memory trace. 
29. McGaugh and Krivanek 1970. 
30. Woodward 2003. Woodward’s view, of course, is not the only view about causal explanations. I will 
not defend his view against the usual contenders, but the reader is welcome to check Woodward and 
Hitchcock 2003, for that purpose.  
31. Woodward 2003: p. 11. 
32. Craver 2002; 2007. 
33. See Craver 2001. For the original formulation, see Machamer et al. 2000. 
34. Craver 2002; 2007. 
35. Craver 2007: 141. 
36. Fellini and collaborators 2009. 
37. E.g., Liu et al. 2012; Ramirez et al. 2013. For a recent review, Josselyn et al 2015. For a philosophical 
view, Robins 2018. 
38. Fraser et al. 2008. 
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39. Fink 1990. 
40. Hallett 2000. 
41. Wagner et al. 1998. 
42. Paller and Wagner 2002. 
43. Wheeler et al. 2000; Nyberg et al. 2000. 
44. Wheeler and Buckner 2003; Gottfried et al. 2004; Woodruff et al. 2005. See Danker and Anderson 2010 
for a recent review. Neuroimaging techniques such as fMRI and ERP are detection rather than intervention 
techniques. However, as I am go on to explain, when combined with intervention techniques, imaging 
methods can provide us with valuable causal information that we wouldn’t have been able to gather 
otherwise. 
45. Rubin and Greenberg 1998. 
46. See Greenberg et al. 2005 for a review of 11 cases. 
47. Patterson et al. 1990. 
48. See Pitcher et al. 2009. 
49. Strevens 2006; 2008. 
50. See, for instance, Bernecker 2017; Robins 2016. 
51. Brainerd and Reyna 2005. 
52. Robins 2020. 
53. De Brigard 2017. 
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